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ABSTRACT 
Naming & Shaming: The impacts of different regimes on hospital 
waiting times in England and Wales 
Improving accountability in public services has been a central objective of 
many public sector reforms in recent years.  Chief among these have been 
efforts to generate observable performance measures as a basis for 
monitoring performance.  This paper examines a natural experiment in 
regimes applied to waiting list targets for hospital admissions in England and 
Wales.  Prior to 2001, each country had similar policies, organisational 
structures for hospital care, and levels of resources.  After 2001, the principal 
difference between the countries were the consequences for hospitals that 
failed to meet targets for waiting times: in England, failure resulted in 
sanctions in a process of ‘naming and shaming’, but in Wales, failure was 
perceived to result in extra resources.  We use hospitals in Wales as a 'control 
group', to examine the effect of ‘naming and shaming’ in England.  We found 
that this policy did indeed reduce waiting times in England as compared with 
Wales.  However, there is some evidence there was in England, initially, some 
shuffling of prospective patients to meet specific targets which increased 
mean waiting times. 
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1 Introduction
Improving accountability in public services has been a central objective of
many public sector reforms in recent years. Chief among these have been
efforts to generate observable performance measures as a basis for monitoring
performance which has been introduced in various forms by governments of
most OECD countries to shift the focus from inputs to outcomes.1 However,
such efforts are not without controversy. Measurable performance criteria
do not always reflect things which matter to consumers. Worse still, this can
result in effort being directed away from desirable goals towards meeting the
target as suggested in the multi-tasking model of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991).
This paper examines the impacts of a regime of ‘naming and shaming’ for
failure to achieve waiting list targets, which applied on a massive scale, to
hospitals in the National Health Service (NHS) in England only. By the year
2000, responsibility for running the NHS in England, Scotland, and Wales was
devolved to governments of each country (devolution was largely stalled in
Northern Ireland). The NHS in each UK country received massive increases
in funding, of 5 per cent in real terms over the six years from 2001-02 (Smee,
2005). Only the government in England, however, sought to change the sys-
tem of perverse incentives that had developed across the different countries:
from one that ignored success and rewarded failure to one that celebrated
success and penalised failure. This was done through the radical and contro-
versial system of annual ‘star rating’ of NHS organisations, between 2001 and
2005, which ‘named and shamed’ those that ‘failed’, which were zero rated;
and offered ‘earned autonomy’ to the ‘high-performing’ three-star organisa-
tions. In Wales and Scotland the system of perverse incentives continued
alongside the very different regime at work in England. The policy dif-
ferences that have emerged following devolution offer a natural experiment
to evaluate their impacts. Propper et al. (2008a,b) have compared perfor-
mance in reducing hospital waiting times in England and Scotland. This
paper compares that performance in England and Wales.
We estimate a difference-in-differences model of the proportion of people
on the waiting list for different times in Wales and England at the level
of a hospital trust.2 Trust fixed effects allow us to control for sources of
1For Canada, for example, see (Perrin, 2002).
2Earlier papers have highlighted differences at the national level in performance on
waiting times (Alvarez-Rosete et al., 2005; Bevan, 2006; Bevan and Hood, 2006a,b). Hauck
and Street (2007) undertook a detailed analysis across three English hospital trusts and one
Welsh hospital trust close to the English-Welsh border. Propper et al. (2008a) estimated
difference-in-differences models of the proportion of people on the waiting list who waited
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unobserved heterogeneity and we also control for common shocks through
the inclusion of year dummy variables. We exploit the fact that the timing
and nature of the treatment in England and Wales is different to identify
the effect of the target on waiting lists. The results show that targets were
indeed effective in bringing down the waiting times in England, where, for
a NHS trust, with a median number of patients waiting in June 1999, the
estimated effect of the 18-, 15- and 12-month targets is to have reduced the
numbers of patients waiting longer than the targeted time to zero. The
9-month target is estimated to have reduced the number of patients waiting
between 9 and 12 months by 67%.
This paper contributes to an emerging body of empirical literature that
examines the consequences of applying performance measurement to public
services. There are four points to make of this literature. First, despite
the growth of the industry of performance measurement, literature reviews
consistently highlight the paucity of rigorous evaluations (Marshall et al.,
2003; Rosenthal and Frank, 2006; Fung et al., 2008; Burgess and Ratto, 2003).
Second, the mere publication of performance measurement is often found to
have had little impact: in US health care (Marshall et al., 2003; Fung et al.,
2008); central government (Norway and the UK), primary schools (Norway),
urban policy (the Netherlands), nuisance control (in a US city) (van Dooren
and de Walle, eds, 2009). Third, there have been a number of studies of
linking performance measurement with financial incentives, which can affect
incomes of organisations, teams or individuals or a mix of these: examples
include tax collection (Brazil), job training (US), teachers (US and Israel),
health care (US and UK) (Heckman et al., 1997; Heinrich, 2002; Rosenthal
and Frank, 2006; Burgess and Ratto, 2003; Campbell et al., 2007; Doran et al.,
2008). Fourth, for health care, Hibbard (Hibbard et al., 2003, 2005; Hibbard,
2008) has argued that, another form of high powered incentives is generated
by careful design of public reporting that inflicts reputational damage; there
is, however only limited evidence from US health care to test this hypothesis
(Bevan and Hamblin, 2009). Pawson (2002) gives numerous examples of
‘naming and shaming’ across diverse elds of public policy in the EU, US
and UK. He examined the evidence of effectiveness of six examples: the Car
Theft Index (CTI) for car manufacturers (UK); non-payers of local taxes
(UK); hospital report cards (US); Sex Offender Registration (Megan’s Law
- US); the Healthcare Financing Administration’s Mortality Studies (US);
the Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI)(US). He argues that the evidence shows
that of these six, only the Car Theft Index was effective. But Fung and
over 6, 9 and 12 months in England and Scotland. All these analyses strongly suggest
that the policy of star ratings did reduce waiting times in England.
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ORourke (2000) produced more recent evidence on the TRI than that used
by Pawson (2002): over its first eight years, the TRI reduced releases of toxic
chemicals by 45 per cent. Fung and O’Rourke argued that there was strong
evidence that the TRI had proved to be much more effective than traditional
command and control because it resulted in public pressure being focused on
the worst polluters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
gives the background policy context for the analysis. It outlines the common
development of the organisation and governance of the NHS in the UK, the
different regimes that then developed in England and Wales after devolution,
and what is known about their impacts. Section three outlines the data and
methodology used while section four presents the results. The concluding
comments are in section five.
2 Background and Context
The NHS in the UK was created in 1948 to provide universal coverage
financed by taxation, largely free at the point of delivery in a publicly-
organised system of functional units (acute hospitals) and units defined ter-
ritorially (for example, care for the mentally ill, ambulances, primary care,
dentistry), which broadly allowed clinical autonomy to medical professionals
in their decisions on treating patients Klein (2006). Periodic reorganizations
changed the boundaries, names and nature of those sub-units, but not the
system’s other abiding characteristics. Reorganization in the 1970s created
health authorities in England and Wales in hierarchical structures that were
responsible for planning services for defined resident populations and running
hospitals and community health services.3
From its inception, the prevailing view was that the NHS was staffed by
publicly spirited workers who needed no incentives, sanctions or rewards –
see Le Grand (2003) for further discussion. But this view began to change
over time. For example, Enthoven (1985) claimed serious problems with the
hierarchical organization of the NHS and its lack of incentives. He described
the NHS as being in a ‘gridlock’: ‘caught in the grip of forces that make
change exceedingly difficult to bring about’ (p. 9), the fundamental problem
being that ‘the system contains no serious incentives to guide the NHS in
the direction of better quality of care at reduced cost’ (p .13). He recom-
mended the introduction of incentives by requiring providers to compete in
an ‘internal market’.
3Different legislation applied the same principles with the creation of Health Boards in
Scotland and Health and Social Service Boards in Northern Ireland.
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This view was ultimately influential in shaping the Thatcher government’s
pursuit of reform. In response, the so-called ‘internal market’, based on
the principle of provider competition, was implemented between 1991 and
1997, with a funding system that promised that ‘money would follow the pa-
tient’(Secretaries of State for Health, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland,
1989; Bevan and Robinson, 2005; Klein, 2006). This led to the reorganization
of the health authorities into purchasers, which contracted for hospitals and
community health services.
In spite of these reforms, waiting times remained a problem.4 In re-
sponse, the government in England announced new policies in 2000, with an
objective of cutting maximum waiting times for elective admission from 18
months to 6 months by the end of 2005 (Secretary of State for Health, 2000).
The principal policy instrument for delivering this transformation was the
system of ‘star ratings’, which applied to acute hospitals from 2001 to 2005
(Department of Health, 2001, 2002; Commission for Health Improvement,
2003a,b; Healthcare Commission, 2004, 2005). This process gave each orga-
nization a score from zero to three stars based on performance against a small
number of ‘key targets’ and a larger set of targets and indicators in a ‘bal-
anced scorecard’. Organizations that failed against ‘key targets’, and were
‘zero-rated’, were ‘named and shamed’ as ‘failing’, and their chief executives
were at risk losing their jobs: this happened to six chief executives of the 12
trusts given ‘zero rating’ in 2001 and four of these improved their rankings in
the following year’s star ratings (Beverley and Haynes, 2005). Organizations
that performed well on both the ‘key targets’ and the ‘balanced scorecard’,
and achieved the highest rating of three stars, were rewarded by being pub-
licly celebrated for being ‘high performing’ and granted ‘earned autonomy’
(Bevan and Hood, 2006a,b).
In the models used for star ratings, the ‘key targets’ were most important.
To justify the claim that star ratings offered a rounded assessment of perfor-
mance, key targets were supplemented by a wider set (about forty) targets
and indicators in a so-called ‘balanced scorecard’. Within the star ratings
of acute trusts and PCTs, reducing hospital waiting times was of overriding
importance; failure to deliver these targets could result in being zero-rated.
For acute trusts: six of the nine key targets were for waiting times (the other
4Failing providers do not exit the market (Tuohy, 1999; Enthoven, 1999; Secretary of
State for Health, 2000; Bevan and Robinson, 2005). It has also proven difficult to create an
effective demand-side either by commissioning services through purchasing organisations
or patient choice. The evidence from two systematic reviews (Marshall et al., 2003; Fung et
al., 2008) of the literature on the effects of publishing information on hospital performance
found that patients did not respond as consumers to use evidence on hospital performance
to switch from poor to good hospitals.
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three were achieving a financial balance, hospital cleanliness, and improv-
ing the working lives of staff): and one of the three domains in ‘balanced
scorecard’ was the ‘patient focus’, which was also dominated by waiting time
targets. The star rating for Primary Care Trusts also included three key
targets for waiting times. Table 1 gives the targets for waiting for elective
admission in England showing how these became more demanding over the
five years of star rating.
The application of targets became more explicit as the system developed.
In the first year (2000/01) the 18-month target applied at end of March only.
In the second year (2001/02) the targets were set were that ‘no patients
waiting more than 18 months for inpatient treatment’ and ‘fewer patients
waiting more than 15 months for inpatient treatment’. From the third year,
failure was defined in terms of the number of breaches and these for each
year were as follows
• 2002/03: the sum of the number of patients waiting longer than 15
months at the end of each the first 11 months of 2002/03 plus the
number of patients who were waiting longer than 12 months at the end
of March 2003;
• 2003/04: the sum of the number of patients waiting longer than 12
months at the end of each the first 11 months of 2003/04 plus the
number of patients who were waiting longer than 9 months at the end
of March 2004;
• 2004/05: the sum of patients waiting more than 9 months at each
month from April 2004 to March 2005.
The ‘star rating’ system succeeded in conveying to those who worked in
the NHS that reducing waiting times mattered by ‘naming and shaming’
those that failed. The evidence from the US is that systems of performance
assessment that are designed to inflict reputational damage on poorly per-
forming hospitals have an impact where markets do not (Hibbard et al., 2003,
2005; Chassin, 2002; Bevan and Hamblin, 2009). Hibbard identified the four
requisite characteristics for a system to inflict damage: these are that it be a
ranking system, published and widely disseminated, easily understood by the
public, and followed up by future reports. The ‘star rating’ system satisfied
all these characteristics (Mannion et al., 2005).
In contrast with England, following devolution, the government in Wales
initially abandoned targets for waiting times (Hauck and Street, 2007), and
when these were introduced from 2001, a report from the Auditor General
for Wales (2005, p. 36) observed that, although waiting times were ‘an
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important part of the Welsh Assembly Government’s overall health policy.
Waiting time targets have been set out in a variety of documents and not
always been clearly and consistently articulated or subject to clear and spe-
cific timescales’. We rely on that report for understanding of the changing
policy in Wales on reducing waiting times.
Targets for waiting times were used in Wales more as an aspiration, in
the hope that managers would respond. These targets were adjusted to
reflect variations in local circumstances, with some Trusts allowed a num-
ber of breaches, which were not publicized, so people on these waiting lists
would have been misled to expect treatment within the relevant waiting time
target (Auditor General for Wales, 2005, p. 35). The system of reporting
performance in Wales from 2003/04 was through targets specified through
the Service and Financial Framework (SaFF) but there was confusion over
the relative priority of the various SaFF targets (although Trusts perceived
financial and waiting time targets to be more important than others); which
was exacerbated by the large number of targets Trusts were expected to
achieve (104 in 2003-04, although these were reduced to 40 in the following
year) (Auditor General for Wales, 2005, p. 39). There was a website that
indicated to the public likely waiting times by specialty, hospital, and special-
ist (Health of Wales Information Service, 2006), but there was no equivalent
system to star ratings in Wales. There was no ranking system, no attempt to
inform the public about hospitals’ performance against targets through reg-
ular reports. Whereas in England, the governments’ response to the problem
of long waiting times was to set ambitious targets, in Wales, targets were
set to reflect existing poor performance. This is illustrated in Table 2, which
gives the targets in place in 2005, the final year of star ratings in England.
The Auditor General for Wales (2005, p. 17) also commented on the contrast
between the ambitious target set in England for a pathway-based maximum
waiting time of 18 weeks from GP referral to treatment, to be achieved by
2008, whereas the Welsh Assembly Government had ‘no similarly clear strat-
egy outlining how it intends to reduce target waiting times over the medium
term’.5
5A complication in comparing performance in England and Wales is that from 1 April
2004, the government in Wales introduced the ‘second offer scheme’ for patients on the
inpatient and day case waiting list if they had waited, or were likely to wait, over 18
months, or would breach the specific targets for particular treatments. This scheme paid
for such patients to be treated at alternative providers (private hospitals in Wales or
hospitals in England) at no charge to the hospital for these patients as the costs were paid
from made central funds. This scheme was extended in June 2004, so that, by March 2005,
it would guarantee an offer of treatment by an alternative provider for those waiting over
twelve months (Auditor General for Wales, 2005, p. 9).
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In addition to the reforms described here that affected the operation
of the NHS, Figure 1 shows the substantial trend increases in funding (£s
per capita) for both England and Wales were similar over the seven years
beginning in 2000-01. The principal difference between the NHS in England
and Wales was in the governance regime.
There is now a large theoretical literature looking at why organizations
that cohere around a public service motive may be different from standard
private organizations run to maximize profit. Here is not the place to review
that literature in detail. However, it is useful to outline how some of the
ideas in that literature affect the interpretation of the results developed here.
A key difficulty in achieving accountability and improving incentives in
public services is the difficulty of measuring the ‘quality’ of the output in a
relevant sense. Public services generally run on the basis of some kind of
non-profit mission as discussed in Besley and Ghatak (2003) where mission
is defined by Wilson (1989, p. 95), as a culture ‘that is widely shared and
warmly endorsed by operators and managers alike’. This measurement prob-
lem leads government to develop broad measurable indicators which are then
used to regulate the performance of public service providers. Some aspects
of accountability can then be tied directly to such measurable indicators.
Since Baker (1992) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), it has been ap-
preciated in the theoretical literature that care needs to be taken in using
imperfect performance indicators to regulate the operation of organizations.
Using high-powered incentives for observable performance can be problem-
atic in this context. Even if you get more of what you are rewarding, as
you would expect, it is essential that this does not come at the expense of
poorer performance on other, harder-to-measure, dimensions. This effort
diversion is frequently referred to as ‘gaming’ in the literature on public sec-
tor performance : Smith (2005) offers a typology; its problematic existence
has been recognised in empirical studies with financial incentives (see for
example, Heinrich, 2002; Doran et al., 2008; Burgess and Ratto, 2003); and
Bevan and Hood (2006a,b) and Bevan and Hamblin (2009) have shown how
‘naming and shaming’ also resulted in gaming.
3 Data and Methodology
This section discusses the data and the way in which we use these to construct
a test for the impact of waiting time targets on the length of waiting times.
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3.1 Data
We obtained data on the distribution of waiting times for each NHS trust in
Wales and England.6 The data is a snapshot of the hospitals’ waiting lists on
the last day of each financial quarter of the NHS. The length of the waiting
time is classified in 7 different 3-month bands (‘waiting between 0 and 3’,
‘between 3 and 6 months’ etc. with the highest being ‘waiting more than 18
months’) and our data consists of the number of patients waiting in each of
those bands.7 It covers 28 quarters in the period from the first quarter of
the financial year 1999/2000, corresponding to end of June 1999, to the last
quarter of the financial year 2005/2006, corresponding to end of March 2006.
Figure 2 presents the type of data we have for one specific NHS trust. It
shows for every of the 28 quarters covered the 7 data-points in our dataset.
The waiting list statistics are patients waiting to be admitted either as
a day case or ordinary admission. The principal difference in definitions be-
tween Wales and England is that, in Wales, all referrals are included whatever
the source, whereas in England, only referrals from medical and dental gen-
eral practitioners are included (Auditor General for Wales, 2005, pp. 50-53).
To get a feel for what the data show, figures 3-9 present the sum of
patients waiting per region for each of the waiting bands. Table 3 presents
the mean and median of the number of patients waiting per trust in each
waiting band for the 9 regions in our data, i.e. Wales and the 8 English
regions. It is evident from these figures that waiting lists fell in line with
the targets and that the gap with Wales opened over the period, suggesting
that the targets did have an impact on hospital policy in England.
3.2 Methodology
To evaluate the effect of the English regime of ‘naming and shaming’ for
failure to achieve targets for waiting times for hospital admission we make
use of the fact that around the time when this regime was introduced in
England, the targets which were introduced into the NHS in Wales were
without a regime of ‘naming and shaming’. In section 4 we will come back to
this when we assess the robustness of our main results. We hence believe the
Welsh NHS to be a suitable control group for evaluating the ‘treatment’ of
the English NHS. The effect of each target can then be identified by running
6The data can be downloaded at www.performance.doh.gov.uk/waitingtimes/index.htm
and www.statswales.wales.gov.uk/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx. We accounted for
mergers by summing the data for the merged hospitals prior to the merger.
7For example, in any hospital we have data on the number of patients waiting between
9 and 12 months on the last day of any financial quarter.
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for each waiting band w = 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18 a simple difference-in-difference
specification of the form
yitw = βw · targetitw + δwi + γwt + ηw · tWales + itw (1)
where γwt is a set of time dummies, δwi a set of NHS trust dummies
and targetitw a dummy being 1 if hospital i is in a region where at time t
a target for waiting category w existed and yitw is the number of patients
waiting in band w in hospital trust i at time t. To allow for a potentially
different underlying trend in the Welsh waiting lists over the period studied
and exploit only the discontinuity of the targets we include a linear Welsh
time trend tWales in (1).
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4 Results
4.1 Core Results
Focusing first on the effect of the waiting time targets on the targeted waiting
category, we present results from the specification in equation (1). The raw
data show that there were negligible numbers of patients in the English NHS
waiting longer than each target, i.e. more than 18, 15, 12 and 9 month,
when the respective targets came into force. Table 4 presents the coefficient
estimates of the effect of each of these targets in the English NHS on the
number of patients waiting over 18 months, between 15 and 18 months,
between 12 and 15 months and between 9 and 12 months, respectively. They
are all negative, significant and large in magnitude. In an English hospital
with a median number of patients waiting in June 1999, the first three targets
are estimated to have reduced the numbers of patients waiting longer than
the targeted time to zero. The 9-month target is estimated to have reduced
the number of patients waiting between 9 and 12 months in an English NHS
trust by 67%, again compared to the median number of patients waiting in
June 1999.
Table 5 presents similar regressions to table 4, but previous treatments
are now included. This allows us to evaluate how progress towards achieving
targets was made already before the target came into force. Column (4)
suggests that the number of patients waiting between 9 and 12 months in
the English NHS decreased already significantly at the times when the 12 and
15-month targets were enacted, so in the two years before the 9-month target
8As a robustness check, we will also consider the Welsh targets after the introduction of
the second offer scheme in March 2004 as treatment (see table 7). All of our main results
are robust to this different specification.
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actually came into force. Including this early treatment effect, the 9-month
target’s estimated effect is to have achieved that no patients were waiting
more than 9 months in a median English NHS trust. The early treatment
effect in anticipation of the announced target can as well be observed for the
12-month target. Column (3) shows that the number waiting longer than
12 months already dropped in the two years prior to the 12-month target
coming into force. However, for the earlier 15-month target no significant
prior drop in the waiting list is estimated.
This finding makes sense in a world of increasingly demanding targets.
The 18-month target had been in place for the NHS in England since 1995
(NHS Executive, 1995). What was new about the regime was that sanctions
applied for failure to meet that target in 2001. Experience of hitting (or
missing) that target would likely have made it clear that systemic changes
would be necessary to continue to meet targets in future.
4.2 Evidence of Gaming of patients on waiting lists?
The results presented suggest that the targets were effective in reducing long
waits. They suggest as well that hospitals early on managed their waiting
lists to fulfil the later targets. At least in the beginning, hospital managers
have tried to game targets by shuﬄing patients across different categories of
waiting times, too. The results of table 5 provide evidence for this. They
show that the reduction in long waits came at the expense of an increase
in the numbers of patients waiting for shorter time periods. In particular,
columns (5)-(7) show that the number of patients waiting between 3 and 9
months significantly increased both after the introduction of the 15- and the
18-month target. For the interpretation of these numbers it is important to
recall that we use census rather than discharge data. If the hospitals had
reacted to the targeting regime by treating additional patients once they
waited for 9 months, and who would have waited even longer prior to the
targeting regime, the numbers of patient waiting less than 9 months should
not change. The increase in the waits between 3 and 9 months hence shows
that patients who, in the absence of the targeting regime, would have waited
0 to 6 months, were now left waiting until their waiting time approached the
maximum allowed.
Again the later targets, i.e. the 12- and the 9-month target, did not
have this effect. Their coefficient estimates are not significantly positive in
columns (5)-(7). But they are generally non-negative and never significantly
negative. This indicates that while the number of close-to-9-month waits did
not increase further, the hospitals were not able (or had no incentive) to cut
back the previously increased level of close-to-9-month waits either. Further,
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the estimated overall effect of the targeting regime, measured by the sum of
the effects of the four targets, is to have increased the number of patients
waiting in all three categories below 9 months waiting time. A t-test for this
sum is significant least at the 5% level for all three categories.
The exception to this rule is the effect of the 9-month target on the
number of patients waiting between 6 and 9 months. However, considering
the early treatment effects outlined above, this might well be driven by the
later to be introduced 6-month target.9
Taken together the results of table 5 seem to suggest that the targets were
effective in reducing long waits, but this was done, at least in part, not by
treating more patients, but by prioritising the treatment of patients waiting
for a long time and leaving other patients, who were only waiting for a short
time, wait longer.
One possible metric to evaluate the overall effect of the targets would be
its effect on the mean-waiting time. Table 7 presents different specifications
of how the mean-waiting time changed with the introduction of the four
targets under study. The table shows that mean waiting times did indeed
decrease after the introduction of the 15- and 12-month targets. However,
they may have increased after the introduction of the 9-month target.
In order to get a feel for the magnitude of the gaming one might ask
what the effect of the targets on the mean waiting time would have been,
had there not been an increase in the number of patients waiting e.g. up to
9 months rather than being treated within 6 or 3 months. We construct this
hypothetical mean waiting time from table 5. Specifically, we calculate this
as the mean-waiting time implied by the predicted values of the regressions
in table 5 after having set the coefficients in columns (5) through (7) to
zero. This reflects the thought-experiment that targets had no effect on
the distribution of below-9-month waits. The result of this comparison is
summarized in figure 10, which plots the actual mean waiting time in England
alongside the hypothetical mean waiting time.10 This calculation suggests in
the first two years of the star rating regime (quarters 8 to 16), the mean-
waiting time would have been up to one month shorter had there not been
any change in waiting at other time lengths; this fell to six months in the
third year (quarters 16 to 20), and subsequently to zero in the fourth year.
This does suggest that there was initially some gaming of the targets, which
9This was to be achieved by December 2005 under the new regime of ‘annual
healthchecks’, the successor to star ratings.
10Since the hypothetical mean waiting time is calculated from the predicted values of
the regressions in table 5, we present as well the mean waiting time calculated from the
predicted values without setting any coefficients to zero. This follows the actual mean
waiting time closely.
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had a material impact on average waiting times, but this declined and ceased
altogether by the fourth year.
4.3 Did the targets have other detrimental effects?
While this exercise is constructive, it does not get at wider possibilities for
redeploying resources to meet the targets which had detrimental effects on
patient care – this would be the classic multi-tasking behavioural response.
There is, however, little evidence that the shorter waiting times in England
were offset by detrimental effects on performance in other dimensions of
quality of care for which we have data. Hauck and Street (2007) report
results of a detailed analysis of four hospitals (three in England and one
in Wales) which were close to the border and serving similar populations
over the period from 1997/98 to 2002/03. They found that, in the English
hospitals, there were increases in activity and low or declining mortality
rates; but, in the Welsh hospital, there was no increased activity and high
and rising mortality rates. Figures 11 and 12 gives national comparisons for
hospital mortality and activity (Finished Consultant Episodes) that include
the period of star ratings (2001-02 to 2005-06). Over that period, Figure 11
shows that, in England, there was a steady trend of declining mortality; and,
in Wales, no such trend and no reduction. (This statistic is a crude indicator
as it does not account for deaths outside hospital.) There are good reasons
why in some cases (e.g., cancer waiting times) that shorter waiting times will
reduce mortality. Figure 11 shows that, in England, there was a steady trend
of increasing activity; and, in Wales, no such trend and no increase.
This finding is in line with the findings of Leatherman and Sutherland
(2003) who examined cross-country comparisons of all available indicators of
quality of care in the two countries and found that Wales performed worse on
most of these (for example, higher mortality rates from: causes considered
amenable to healthcare, coronary heart disease, stroke and diabetes). An
audit by the Royal College of Physicians (2006) highlighted the much worse
organisation of stroke care in Wales, which meant that patients treated in
Wales were more likely die from stroke, or if they survived would have higher
levels of disability than in England or Northern Ireland (Royal College of
Physicians, 2006).
5 Conclusion
This paper has exploited a natural experiment between two regimes for hos-
pital waiting time targets in which failure resulted in ‘naming and shaming’
13
in England was perceived to be rewarded in Wales. Using Wales as a con-
trol group, we found that ‘naming and shaming’ did reduce the time that
patients waited. In fact, such waiting has all but been eliminated by the use
of targets combined with real sanctions for hospital chief executives. Given
that the identification proposed here is quite clean, it is reasonable to argue
that what we have found is a behavioural effect at the hospital level. It shows
that targets with sanctions – part of the ‘naming and shaming’ regime that
has been used in recent years to improve public services in England – has
had an impact: that increased funding together with ‘naming and shaming’
meant that the performance of the NHS in England (as measured by waiting
times) was transformed; and the absence of ‘naming and shaming’ meant
that no similar transformation took place in Wales. And that providers in
Wales were able to use the extra funding to extract provider rents, particu-
larly as we were unable to find any hard evidence of changes in England in
response to the regime there were detrimental to patient welfare as compared
to Wales.
Propper et al. (2008b), in their comparison of England and Scotland,
found that the target regime in England led to a shift in the distribution
of waiting times towards meeting targets and reductions in the numbers of
patients with long waiting times in the tail of the distribution; in contrast, in
Scotland, the distribution of waiting times shifted in the opposite direction
increasing the number of longer waits and reducing the number that waited
below the target set for England. They found little evidence of gaming of
patients on waiting lists in England: no evidence of re-ordering of patients
on lists to meet targets; some evidence of waiting list manipulation (patients
were removed, temporarily and permanently, from waiting lists but no evi-
dence that this manipulation was harmful to the health of patients). Their
analysis of evidence of patient quality suggests that this improved in England
relative to Scotland (for three measures of mortality, 30 day mortality rates
for all admissions, all emergency admissions and emergency admissions for
acute myocardial infarction).
Our paper began by emphasising the sparsity of good empirical evidence
to evaluate the industry of performance measurement; the disappointing find-
ings of much of this empirical literature, that the whilst this industry cre-
ates jobs for those involved in the production of measures of performance,
it seems to have little effect on those whose performance is measured; and
theoretical reasons and empirical evidence of gaming when measures of per-
formance are linked to high-powered incentives. Our analyses, and those by
Propper et al. (2008a,b), of the natural experiment of the target regime in
England in comparison with Wales and Scotland is vital empirical evidence
of the effectiveness of linking performance measurement with high-powered
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incentives in the form of ‘naming and shaming’. Like Propper et al we have
found little evidence of gaming using the routinely available data. So why
has the harsh regime of ‘star rating’, that was introduced in England only,
transformed performance in England relative to Wales and Scotland with so
little evidence of adverse outcomes? We agree with the explanations sug-
gested by Propper et al: only limited measures of quality are available; as
waiting times were widely recognised as a weakness of the NHS, this could
become accepted as a mission by its employees; and the target regime was
a long-term commitment to reduce waiting times requiring systemic change
that could be implemented because of the massive increases in funding. We
emphasise a further explanation: that waiting time targets were a crucial
but not the only part of performance measurement by ‘star ratings’. Other
indicators and results of inspections determined ‘star ratings’ and thus would
curb gaming by reducing effort on these other measured elements of quality
of care. These indicators included, for example, 30-day hospital mortality
rates (which included deaths outside hospital), hospital re-admission rates,
and results from surveys of patients and staff. Results of inspections included
hospital cleanliness and those by the Commission for Health Improvement
into implementing systems of governance to improve and assure the quality
of care: as these were based on visits they stood a good chance of discovering
flagrant diversion of effort away from quality of care to meet waiting time
targets (Bevan and Cornwell, 2006). Nevertheless, one of the weaknesses of
‘star ratings’ was the absence of a systematic audit to counter gaming (Bevan
and Hood, 2006a,b; Bevan and Hamblin, 2009).
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Tables
Table 1
Targets for waiting for elective admission in England
Year at start of year (months) at end of year (months)
2000/01 18 18
2001/02 18 15
2002/03 15 12
2003/04 12 9
2004/05 9 9
Sources: Department of Health (2001, 2002); Commission for
Health Improvement (2003a), Healthcare Commission (2004,
2005).
Table 2
Waiting time targets for England and Wales in 2005
Type of waiting England (weeks) Wales (weeks)
For first outpatient appointment 13 78
For inpatient / day case treatment 26 78
Source: Auditor General for Wales (2005a: 15).
Table 3
Descriptive statistics (end of June 1999)
trusts mean (median) number of patients waiting per trust
<3m 3m-6m 6m-9m 9m-12m 12m-15m 15m-18m >18m
England 159 3340 1554 863 510 227 73 0
(3156) (1466) (796) (406) (153) (33) (0)
Eastern 18 3128 1540 897 578 351 149 0
(2856) (1493) (796) (468) (252) (74) (0)
London 28 2804 1300 736 466 238 84 0
(2962) (1291) (648) (369) (151) (67) (0)
North West 22 4057 1715 976 578 235 84 0
(3590) (1676) (939) (574) (161) (45) (0)
North. and Yorkshire 17 3877 1822 948 504 101 6 0
(3372) (1699) (1006) (395) (38) (0) (0)
South East 25 3313 1695 1022 622 286 84 0
(3112) (1563) (1049) (591) (240) (54) (0)
South West 18 3034 1458 733 410 185 49 0
(2694) (1468) (803) (272) (107) (18) (0)
Trent 14 3895 1721 978 593 262 80 0
(3376) (1457) (925) (539) (134) (42) (0)
West Midlands 17 2894 1263 617 306 121 26 0
(2666) (1258) (620) (237) (69) (14) (0)
Wales 12 2284 1062 704 509 228 171 221
(1862) (855) (533) (387) (166) (87) (47)
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Table 4
Estimates of effects of targets
patients waiting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
over 18m 15m to 18m 12m to 15m 9m to 12m
18 month -192.0*
(92.6)
15 month -191.4**
(45.0)
12 month -193.9**
(20.5)
9 month -273.2**
(36.1)
N 4682 4682 4682 4682
R2 0.76 0.66 0.65 0.76
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; standard errors in paren-
theses are clustered at trust level; all regressions include trust and
time dummies and a Wales-specific time trend.
Table 5
Targets and Past Targets
patients waiting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
over 18m 15m to 18m 12m to 15m 9m to 12m 6m to 9m 3m to 6m below 3m
18 month -192.0* -55.5 -110.7** 29.1 369.0** 399.7** 300.7*
(92.6) (28.8) (42.3) (48.2) (41.2) (54.5) (152.1)
15 month -177.1** -277.4** -148.5** 187.2** 302.5** 142.8
(38.7) (46.9) (39.0) (31.5) (51.0) (82.3)
12 month -217.6** -252.4** 30.4 108.7* -14.0
(27.7) (32.2) (35.4) (48.9) (83.7)
9 month -284.9** -225.3** 91.7 233.2*
(44.3) (53.6) (77.5) (102.0)
N 4682 4682 4682 4682 4682 4682 4682
R2 0.76 0.66 0.66 0.76 0.84 0.91 0.96
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; standard errors in parentheses, the standard errors are
clustered at trust level; all regressions include trust and time dummies and a Wales-specific time
trend.
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Table 6
Estimates of effects of targets on mean waiting times
mean waiting time
(1) (2) (3)
18 month -0.037 -0.037 0.176
(0.255) (0.165) (0.259)
15 month -0.738** -0.738** -0.583**
(0.194) (0.156) (0.149)
12 month -0.886** -0.886** -0.731**
(0.162) (0.162) (0.144)
9 month 0.377 0.377* 0.629**
(0.193) (0.188) (0.209)
Wales t-trend Yes Yes No
s.e. Cluster(trust) Robust Cluster(trust)
R2 0.85 0.85 0.85
N 4682 4682 4682
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** sig-
nificant at 1%; all regressions include trust and time dum-
mies.
Table 7
Wales considered treatment for t > 24
patients waiting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
over 18m 15m to 18m 12m to 15m 9m to 12m 6m to 9m 3m to 6m below 3m
18 month -147.1* -12.7 15.4 103.7** 213.2** 171.9** 181.8
(63.3) (16.4) (22.7) (28.9) (28.6) (38.0) (111.6)
15 month -130.8** -181.7** -91.0** 79.6** 148.4** 61.9
(25.2) (31.0) (25.2) (20.5) (36.4) (50.0)
12 month -131.9** -202.6** -91.2** -73.3 -108.5
(16.2) (19.8) (25.6) (39.0) (72.8)
9 month -289.2** -274.1** 6.3 190.4*
(41.3) (51.6) (71.4) (84.8)
N 4682 4682 4682 4682 4682 4682 4682
R2 0.77 0.68 0.67 0.76 0.84 0.91 0.96
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; standard errors in parentheses, the standard errors are
clustered at trust level; all regressions include trust and time dummies and a Wales-specific time
trend.
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